A LEGAL REGIME FOR DEEP SEA MINING
John L. Mero*
During the past few years an incredible number of
conferences have been held, articles written, proposals made and
resolutions passed concerning a legal regime to control
development of the resources of the world ocean. Much of the
debate generated on this subject stems from diplomatic sources
and in those circles a great emphasis is placed on verbal activities
or negotiations rather than action. Another source of endless
conversation concerning the law of the sea is legal groups; since
talk is the stock in trade of these groups, they can hardly be
criticized. Rarely are the activitists, in this case the fishermen or
miners, asked for their opinions concerning what kind of law they
would like to have covering their activities in the ocean. And the
general attitude of these operators of ocean-oriented enterprises is
to ignore the legalists until trouble develops or some government
decides to enforce a decree concerning activities in a certain area
of the ocean.
In the case of mineral resources of the ocean, it is well to
have some idea of the magnitude of the potential resource and its
expected effect on world social or economic welfare if exploited
on a substantial scale. There is no doubt whatsoever that supplies
of raw materials vitally affect relationships between nations.
Adequate supplies of raw materials for expanding populations or
economies have been a prime cause of wars between nations from
the beginning of human civilization. The great oil discoveries in
northern Alaska' will greatly affect the relations between the
United States and the nations of northern Europe on the one hand
and the nations of the Middle East on the other if the Alaskan
oil can be produced and delivered to markets at a price
economically competitive with oil from the Middle East.
All highly industrialized societies depend to a very high
degree on adequate supplies of a host of mineral commodities. In
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of an oil field near Prudhoe Bay in northern Alaska which is expected to produce in excess

of 10 billion barrels of oil. Late in 1969, lease sales in this area yielded over $900 million
to the state of Alaska. North American Attention Shifts to Alaska's Prudhoe Bay Region,
169 WORLD OIL No. 3, 64, 66 (1969).
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one way this dependence is a force for peace and stabilization as
it makes all nations more dependent on one another. Mineral
deposits, however, are not uniformly distributed throughout the
earth's crust. Economic sources of some mineral commodities
occur sometimes in a single nation or a small group of nations,
generally to the detriment of the have-not nations. Mineral
deposits, in fact, are very inadequately distributed throughout the
surface of the continents of the earth. Thus the nations of southern
Africa control over 90 percent of the diamond raw materials of
the earth, the Congo and Canada are the world's major suppliers
of cobalt, Canadian companies control the bulk of the world's
supply of nickel, the United States is the world's major supplier
of molybdenum, the Soviet Union holds over 70 percent of the
economic reserves of manganese in the world, a group of five or
so nations produce the bulk of the world's primary copper, and
so on. 2 Highly industrialized nations try to develop as many
alternate sources of mineral commodities as possible so as not to
be too dependent on any one source or nation. A primary
underlying cause of the American intervention in Vietnam must
be to prevent that portion of the world and, thus, Indonesia, and
possibly Australia, from falling into the control of unfriendly
nations, for Indonesia and Australia have been long recognized as
two of the great untapped sources of raw materials of the world.
The great investments of American corporations in mining
ventures in Australia and Indonesia in recent years only
emphasize this observation.
When the metal-rich deposits of the ocean are developed on
a substantial scale, it will greatly affect the economies of various
nations, especially of those nations that are highly dependent on
such commodities as nickel, cobalt, copper or manganese. That
development we can foresee. Other situations which may develop
with large scale production of minerals from the sea can only be
speculated about at this time. In any case it is proper for those
concerned with international legal regimes to consider the
resources of the sea, not as a bottomless pit of funds for financing
international welfare programs (for, as we shall see, it is doubtful
that the resources of the sea will ever provide much monetary
wealth unless the entire economics of the world mining industry
are juggled) but in regard to the effects that this source of raw
2. EIMJ Annual Survey and Outlook, 170 ENG. & MIN. J. No. 3 (1969).

SAN DIEGO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 7

materials will have on populations around the world. Advances in
technology almost always hurt some small group economically for
a time, but almost always benefit a much larger group. Thus,
when production of copper from the ocean floor deposits shuts
down mines in such nations as Chile or Zambia, which nations'
economies are highly dependent on production of this metal from
mines located therein, the copper miners of those nations will be
momentarily hurt. But a much larger segment of the world
population will be immeasurably helped by the development of an
essentially unlimited source of a vital industrial metal at a price
much less than that for which this metal can now be produced
from continental deposits. Populations in underdeveloped nations
of the world which cannot afford to use copper at $0.70 per
pound 3 or nickel at $1.30 per pound4 will be able to afford to use
these metals when the price is only $0.20 per pound.
Considered in this light, the development of the resources of
the sea will be a great boon to the developing nations of the world.
Of course, if controlled by some international agency, the price
of ocean-obtained metals can be held artificially high with the
profits being drained off as royalties to the international agency.
The international agency would then, presumably, redistribute
these funds throughout the world in the form of land development
projects designed to improve the material life of local inhabitants.
But in the process this international agency would build a great
bureaucracy to administer the collection and redistribution of
these funds, and, while the bureaucrats will undoubtedly live much
better, the producers and consumers of the material produced will
not gain as much as if they were left to work the deposits and
consume them on their own.
Another aspect of developing the resources of the sea is that
the level of technology required is not indicated to be of a level
unattainable by most nations of the world. Since the deposits tend
to be vast in size, all nations can exploit them to any degree they
wish without affecting the exploitation of the deposits by any
other nation. In one sense this situation would be disadvantageous
for the peace of the world, for it would lead to a greater degree
of national independence. If all nations were totally dependent on
all other nations for some vital raw material, there would be a
3. Id. at 29-30.
4. Id.
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tendency for all nations to attempt to live with each other on a
more peaceful, trade-inducing basis. On the other hand, as all
nations and groups within individual nations might choose to
mine in the ocean in exactly the same location (an almost
inconceivably but remotely possible circumstance) with the
ensuing difficulties that that situation would incur, it is probably
well to have some legal regime governing exploitation of mineral
deposits of the sea. But there are other more pressing reasons.
All mineral deposits of the earth vary in composition and
value from place to place and time to time. The mineral deposits
of the sea are no different in this regard; however, the recognized
mineral deposits of the sea tend to be spread out over much
greater lateral areas of the earth's surface than are continental
mineral deposits. In any case it will require much effort on the
part of the potential miner to find a deposit he considers of
acceptable grade, depth of water, location in reference to weather,
distance to port, etc.; thus, there is some reason for allowing such
a prospector to lay claim to a deposit that he may have found
after great expense. Also, changes in the environment that might
be caused in the mining of any oceanic deposit, while expected to
be negligible in most cases, must be considered and, if occurring,
must be controlled. Deposits must be made available to all comers
if competition in pricing is to be attained with the consumers
ultimately benefitting. Conservation must be practiced so that the
deposits are not wasted by using highly profitable but inefficient
recovery systems.
So all of us, internationalists, diplomats, lawyers and even
miners, would prefer to see a legal regime adopted covering
exploitation of the mineral deposits of the sea. There is, however,
a considerable difference of opinion between the miners and the
other groups on the design of this legal regime and what it should
work to accomplish. For the miners will want a legal system
which works to promote development of these deposits while
preserving as much freedom of action as possible in determining
exploration and exploitation systems. "Getting the rock in the
box," or production of the mineral, has always been the prime
concern of the miner, many times to the detriment of the
environment, which in past times was not always of much
consideration to anyone. Diplomats, lawyers, trade protectionists,
bureaucrats, etc. sometimes have very different motives in
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designing the legal regime. If such individuals play the major role,
it could doom ocean mining forever. The formulation of the law
is much too important to be left to the lawyers or diplomats.
There are a myriad of reasons why persons from these professions
should not play a major role in the formation of this regime, a
major one being that lawyers and diplomats tend to be
traditionalists. The extrapolation of existing land laws to the
deposits of the sea would be fatal to the ocean deposits, for they
vary in many important characteristics from any mineral deposit
ever found on land. The legal regime must take into account the
known characteristics of the deposits to have any tangible
association with reality. If reality is ignored, and it has largely
been ignored in past proposals for oceanic resource legal regimes,
then it will work a great hardship on the workers. If the needs of
the workers are disregarded in the design of this regime, they
might choose not to work at all. And, in the end, it will be the
needs of the workers, i.e., the mining companies, that will be
important in establishing this ocean mining industry. In the past,
on land, it generally has been the miners themselves who
established their code of ethics concerning mining operations. This
system has worked very well; at least, it did until pollution of the
environment became a major problem. We should give it a try in
the ocean, for while the miners of the past have been almost
totally negligent in their concern about pollution of the earth's
natural environments, the present day managers of the world
mining industry are very much aware of this problem and will be
the group that eventually solves these problems with, of course,
proper pressure being applied by the rest of society.
Thus, the ideas for a legal regime for deep sea mining that
will be outlined in this article will be ones that favor the workers.
Much of it is opinion based on my belief that such legal
conditions would encourage development of the mineral resources
of the ocean without hindering other uses of the ocean to any
measurable degree and without noticeable changes to the natural
environment. This legal regime will deal only with those parts of
the ocean outside present limits of national jurisdiction. Once the
deep sea mining industry is established, we will know better what
regulations we can live with and the rules can be modified by
internationalists who might see ends that the miners do not see in
the mineral deposits of the sea. Until usable commodities are
being produced from the deep sea deposits, all discussions
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concerning deep sea mining legal regimes are really only
academic. There are some groups with a considerable
constitutency who believe that many financial problems of the
world can be solved by the profits to be generated by mining the
deposits of the ocean. Some groups even believe that these funds
could finance a new world government which, hopefully, would be
somewhat more effective at governing the world populations than
past or present international associations have been. While
effective world government is a goal highly to be desired, it should
be established because it is needed. If the control and distribution
of the profits to be gained by mining the mineral resources of the
deep sea are a necessary object by which to form this government,
then I, for one, am perfectly willing to assign the deposits to this
new world government. If, however, the government depends for
its financial support on such profits, which are largely illusory,
then it will rapidly collapse unless such funds are forthcoming. A
much better scheme would be to internationalize all resources of
the world and assign ownership of these resources to a world
government. Artificial prices for minerals could be established
which would, however, have some economic basis, and the world
government could thereby generate funds for its operations. Such
a system would penalize the poorer people of the world by raising
the prices of commodities they need, but sometimes it is easier and
less traumatic for a government to raise its funds that way than
via the much more equitable and honest graduated income tax
method. In any case, it is generally conceded by almost everyone
who has studied this field that some kind of a regime should be
established to regulate development and production of minerals
from the sea.
Before outlining the proposed legal regime, it might be well
to describe the deposits of the deep sea and their apparent
potential worth to society.
THE MINERAL DEPOSITS OF THE DEEP SEA

A strict definition of the deep ocean, or those parts of the
ocean not now under national jurisdiction, is rather hard to come
by. The only convention which would seem to apply is the
Convention on the Continental ShelP formulated at Geneva in
5. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Sept. 15, 1958 [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578,449 U.N.T.S. 311.
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1958 and now ratified by about 40 member nations of the U.N.
Basically that convention states that a nation may lay claim to
the ocean floor adjacent to its shores for purposes of mineral
exploitation out to a water depth of 200 meters or to that depth
which admits of the exploitation of minerals.6 This "exploitability
clause" has become a matter of much debate among ocean
lawyers. Presumably a nation could move its boundaries out over
the ocean floor to any distance from its land, provided it could
exploit the minerals therein. In the extreme, this convention would
lead to a division of the ocean floor by the median line concept.
It was certainly not the intention of the framers of this convention
that such a division of the deep ocean floor should take place and
this situation is not likely to occur, as it would work to the
disadvantage of many major nations such as China, the U.S.S.R.,
Germany, Italy, etc. The maximum depth at which national
jurisdiction has thus far been claimed under the 1958 Geneva
convention is about 7,000 feet in the Red Sea, where Sudan has
laid claim to that portion of the Red Sea floor adjacent its coast
out to the median line of that body of water. The exploitability
clause was used to justify this proclamation.
Other nations such as Chile, Ecuador and Peru define their
continental shelves as extending to a distance of 200 miles from
their shores. 7 While the proclamations of these nations were made
mainly to control fishing in the superjacent waters, they would
presumably also apply to minerals underlying these waters, as the
proclamations describe this 200-mile outer limit as the continental
shelves of these nations. Water depths of 20,000 feet or more are
found in these areas.
A more logical approach to defining the continental shelves
of maritime nations would be to fix the outer boundary in space,
defining it as so many miles from the present coastline or to a
depth of so many meters, whichever is greater. The measurements
suggested by a number of authors (Brooks, Mero) are a distance
of 100 miles or a depth of 2,500 meters. The 2,500-meter depth
has a basis in geologic fact, since an outer boundary at this depth
would include all geologic continental shelf areas, while the 2006. Official Records of the United Nations Conference on The Law of the Sea,
A/Conf. 13/38.
7. Chapman, Legal Problems in Harvesting Mineralsof the Deep Sea Bed, Symposia
on Economic Importanceof Chemicalsfrom the Sea, AmI. CHEm. Soc. 177-86 (1963).
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meter depth contour does not.' Because of the geologic nature of
the continental shelves and slopes, with the drop-off to the deep
sea floor being rather rapid once it starts, the moving of the outer
boundary of national jurisdiction from 200 meters to a depth of
2,500 meters would not add more than about ten percent to the
present areal extent of the continental shelves of the world's
nations as defined at the 200-meter depth contour. Everything
outside this depth contour or the 100-mile distance line then would
be considered open ocean, free to all comers and awaiting some
future meeting of the nations of the world to formulate a legal
regime. The 2,500-meter depth contour or 100-mile distance line
appears to be quite practical from a geologic standpoint and
politically is fair to all nations bordering the sea. It should be
adopted as soon as is practical to forestall any uncertainty about
whose property an ocean miner is working on when he is working
in the deep ocean outside these limits.
While the recognized mineral deposit potential of the
continental shelf and slope area within the 2,500-meter depth
contour is large and highly varied, containing such deposits as oil
and gas, limestone, sand and gravels, iron ore, coal, sulphur,
barite, bauxite, phosphorite and placer deposits of diamonds,
gold, platinum, titanium minerals, tin, chromite, zircon, etc., 9 the
mineral deposit potential of the deep ocean floor appears, at the
present time, to be quite limited.10 The presently recognized
mineral deposits of the deep sea, that area outside the 2,500-meter
depth contour, is limited to the cobalt-copper-nickel-manganese
rich nodules. Siliceous and calcereous oozes may hold some
economic potential; however, there is no shortage of these
commodities on continental areas12 and such deposits would likely
be mined only after the manganese nodules are being mined. The
JOIDES' deep sea drilling project has uncovered what appears to
8. Brooks, Deep Sea Manganese Nodules: From Scientific Phenomenon to World
Resource, PROC. SECOND ANN. CONF. LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, UNIV. OF R.I. 96

(1967).
9. J. MERO,

THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA,

53-80 (1965).

10. Id. at 120-27.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 111-17.
13. JOIDES is an acronym for Joint Oceanographic Institutes Deep Sea Drilling
Project. In this program the National Science Foundation is financing drilling of about
100 holes to depths of 1,000 to 2,500 feet into the ocean floor in the pelagic areas of the

ocean (water in excess of 10,000 feet depth in general). The initial phase of this project is
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be petroleum deposits in certain deep sea areas in the Gulf of
Mexico at a depth of about 12,500 feet; however, it will be many
years before anyone has the capability of producing oil from such
a depth. While we can speculate on the occurrence of a variety of
mineral deposits in the deep ocean, thus far the only known
deposits in this area of the sea which show great economic
potential are the manganese nodules.
This situation, however, is not without substantial merit, as
the seafloor nodules (generally called manganese nodules as
manganese tends to be the dominant metal found therein) contain
about 15 industrially useful metals, most of which would be
produced in any operation to recover elements from the nodules.
Thus, the sea floor nodules are a potential economic source of
manganese, nickel, cobalt, copper, zinc, molybdenum, zirconium,
cerium, lead, titanium, iron, vanadium and several rare earth
elements. Of these metals, only manganese, nickel, cobalt, copper,
molybdenum and zirconium would be produced in quantities
which would upset present world sources of these metals. The
present free world value of these metals produced is about $8
billion and a number of nations' economies are highly dependent
on production and sale of several of these metals. To cite an
example of how upsetting production of these metals from the
ocean might be: A single operation in the ocean, mining 15
million tons of the nodules per year (which is the size of operation
under consideration by one major world mining company), which
nodules would contain 2.5 percent of copper, 2.0 percent of nickel,
0.2 percent of cobalt, 36 percent of manganese, 0.2 percent of
zinc, 0.06 percent of molybdenum, 0.06 percent of zirconium and
0.06 percent of lead, would produce the following percentages of
the present free world production of these metals: manganese, 150
percent; copper, 7.5 percent; nickel, 73 percent; cobalt, 160
percent; zinc, one percent; molybdenum, 15 percent; zirconium,
350 percent; and lead, 0.4 percent. Such production rates would
completely upset the cobalt, nickel, manganese and zirconium
markets. Considering that this would be only one operation by
one company tends to compound the upset. As several companies
from the United States alone will enter this field, practically all
described in Initial Reports of the Deep Sea Drilling Project, I ORANGE, TEXAS TO
HoBOKEN, N.J. (Aug.-Sept., 1968). On the second hole drilled in this program in the Gulf
of Mexico, oil was discovered in the Sigsbee Knolls area at a water depth of 12,500 feet.
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markets for these metals will be greatly affected. Incidentally, the
product value produced by one of these operations would be about
$1.8 billion if all the products could be sold at present market
quoted prices. The capital investment to build the facilities to
mine and handle 50,000 tons of the nodules per day can be
expected to be about $200 million; however, the net profit on this
operation, assuming continental production prices control the
pricing of the offshore obtained metals, would probably be about
$800 million per year after U.S. taxes are paid.14
Therefore, it is obvious that metal prices of the metals that
can be produced from the sea floor nodules will drop rather
rapidly once a competitive situation develops in the offshore. It
is now expected that the production price for copper, nickel and
cobalt from deep sea mines will eventually be about $0.15 per
pound or from 25 percent for copper to ten percent for nickel of
the present (1970) selling price of these metals.1 5 World
consumption of these metals will greatly increase as those
populations in Africa, Latin America and Asia, which do not now
consume these metals in large quantities because they cannot
afford them, start to consume at these prices. Once consumption
of these metals is initiated, most nations will want to have their
own mining operations in the ocean to save on foreign exchange.
The stage will be set for 50 or more deep sea mining operations
where ten large operations would easily supply the entire present
world needs at any reasonable prediction of future consumption.
Competition for the deposits most economic to mine will become
intense under such circumstances and there will be no end of claim
jumping, piracy and trouble unless some legal regime is initiated
to forestall such happenings.
The time table to be reached for the above stages in deep sea
mining is approximately as follows: Within the next ten years the
first operator will be mining and processing the nodules on an
economic, large-scale basis-at a rate of at least three million tons
per year; within 15 years at least five operators will be mining and
processing about 50 million tons of the nodules per year; within
about 30 years at least 50 operators will want to produce about
200 million tons of the nodules per year. As technology and
communications develop, the time span required for such
14. Author's calculations.
15. Id.

[Vol. 7

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

developments to spread throughout the world is considerably
shortened the estimated time span for deep ocean mining
developments might be contracted over the above estimates so that
within the next 20 years problems will develop without a rational
legal regime to govern exploitation of minerals from the deep sea.
Thus, the goal of the international legal experts should be to have
the deep ocean mining law formulated some time within the next
ten years and enacted and in force within the next 15 years, or
by 1985.

A

PROPOSED LEGAL REGIME FOR DEEP SEA MINING

Any rationale and effective legal regime to control leasing of
mineral deposits in the deep ocean must take cognizance of the
character of the deposits being leased. In the case of the sea floor
nodules, these deposits are presently recognized as being
constituted of only a monolayer of roughly spherical nodules,
averaging about two to three inches in diameter."6 The areal
concentration of these deposits ranges from about 15,000 to
150,000 tons per square mile of ocean floor." On land, mineral
deposits *are generally three dimensional in shape; thus rather
small surface areal claims can cover a large tonnage of ore. In the
deep sea, a rather large areal coverage is needed if the miner is to
control sufficient tonnage to repay his investment and operation
costs and to allow an adequate profit. Although there are a
number of mechanical characteristics involved which make the sea
floor nodules substantially different in character from land
deposits,"8 the essentially two dimensional character is the one
which will have the greatest bearing on the formulation of a legal
system governing their exploitation.
Another interesting characteristic of the nodules is the
marked change in composition over large lateral distances in the
Pacific Ocean. Along the continents, they are rich in iron while
in the central part of the ocean and on certain topographic highs,
the nodules tend to be enriched in cobalt. 9 In several areas of the
Pacific, nodules which are almost pure manganese dioxide are
16.
17.
18.
19.
1960).

J. MERO, supra note 9, at 127"32.

Id.at 165-75.
Id. at 129-35.
Mero, Minerals on the Ocean Floor, 203

SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN

64, 66 (Dec.
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found. 21 In the areas of the ocean far removed from islands or
continents, the nodules are rich in nickel and copper. 21 As the
equatorial regions are approached, the percentage of copper in the
22
nodules increases markedly.
From present indications there appear to be about 1.5 trillion
tons of the nodules now exposed at the surface of the sediments
of the Pacific Ocean.23 If only ten percent of these deposits prove
economical to exploit, using average percentages of such metals
as manganese, nickel, cobalt and copper, it can be calculated that
the reserves of these metals in the nodules are measured in terms
of thousands of years on the basis of present day world
consumption.. Thus, for all practical purposes, the reserves of the
nodules can be considered to be unlimited. In general, where there
is an unlimited amount of a resource, no one gets too excited
about anyone else exploiting it. Certainly this is true in the case
of oxygen and nitrogen which are taken from the atmosphere or
in the taking of minerals from seawater. Although there are
hundreds of such operations throughout the world, no one pays a
royalty to anyone for exploitation of such resources and no one
answers to anyone else in exercising his right of exploitation. A
major difference in such resources and the sea floor nodules is that
the atmosphere and seawater are generally considered as having
a very uniform composition throughout the world; sea floor
nodules are not uniform in their composition, concentration, size
or other aspects which greatly affects the economics of mining.
Also the nodules do not shift their position in space from time to
time as do the minerals in the atriosphere or in seawater. Thus,
the nodules fall into a mineral deposit category in which leasing
of various deposits can be beneficial to the mining operators and,
of course, beneficial to the leasing agency.
LeasingAgency
The leasing agency could probably best be a function of the
United Nations. Its functions would be largely administrative: a
clearing-house for claim registrations and policing of the work
requirements and a collection agency for fees and royalties paid
20. Id. at 65.
21. Id. at 66.
22. Id.
23. J.MERO, supra note 9, at 165-79.
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for the privilege of having claims registered and worked. A small
staff of less than 25 persons would be required for these functions,
as it is not anticipated that there will be many claims registered
or worked. A prime requisite for securing a lease would be
financial and technical competence in working the claim, which
would rule out speculation in the deposits of the deep sea. Thus,
it is not anticipated that too many claims would be registered,
certainly not more than 100 or so over the next 30 years.
After the agency is established, a code of laws would be
formulated which would allow the technically and financially
competent nationals of any nation to stake claims on any area of
the deep ocean floor they wished. The size of these claims for
individuals, partnerships, or corporate entities should be limited,
probably to a maximum of 5,000 square miles and a minimum
of 1,000 square miles. The claim boundaries would be defined in
terms of lines of latitude and longitude. Five thousand square
miles would contain at least 100 million tons of the nodules, which
should be an amortization tonnage for any capital investment
necessary to put that property in production. The aggregate
claims of any given nation should be limited so that the total area
claimed would not contain more than 100 years' reserves of one
of the major economic minerals in the nodules-manganese,
nickel, cobalt and copper. Thus, nationals of the United States
would be limited to a total claimed area of about three million
square miles of the ocean floor, which area would normally
contain 100 years' reserves of copper for the United States at her
present rate of consumption. 2' These areas allowed would, of
course, be adjusted as consumption rates change. Three million
square miles would be only about five percent of the total area of
the Pacific Ocean suspected to contain deposits of the nodules. If
all the three million square miles were taken up, it would require
some 600 separate claims, assuming an average claim area of
5,000 square miles. Since only about 40 of these operations,
assuming an average production rate per unit of five million tons
of nodules per year containing an average of one percent copper,
could produce the total United States consumption in copper
annually, not to mention the tremendous over-production of
manganese, nickel, cobalt, zircon, molybdenum, etc. that would
be produced as a by-product, only a small fraction of the
24. E/MJAnnualSurvey and Outlook, supra note 2.
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allowable areas would actually be taken up and worked unless the
operators wished to court bankruptcy.
The law would have provisions concerning multiple use of the
areas so that mining does not interfere with fishing, shipping,
communication cables, and vice versa. The law would require
performance on the part of the claimant and the spending of some
nominal sum, such as $100 per square mile of claim per year, to
hold this claim. The length of time that an individual -can hold a
claim before he puts it into production should be limited, probably
to ten years. If the operator fails to spend his performance funds
in exploration or development of his claim, he may pay an
equiValent sum to the registry agency at the end of each annual
period. All funds spent in developing the claim or in exploration
in it would be applicable against the annual performance
payment. Failure to do the work or pay the performance fee
would result in the lapse of the claim. Affidavits would be filed
annually, briefly describing the nature of the work and the amount
of money spent up to the minimum sum necessary to hold the
claim. Registry agents should, of course, be allowed access to
vessels of the claimant to confirm work requirements.
When production is initiated on any given property or claim,
a nominal royalty of perhaps $1 per ton of nodules mined and
processed would be paid to the registry agency. The funds received
for claim registry, in lieu of work requirements, or as royalty
payments, would be used to support the -administrative costs of
the registry agency and that function alone. The deep sea nodules
should not be viewed as an independent source of income for the
United Nations or any other political agency.
In registering a claim with this agency, the claimant would
thus gain exclusive rights to mine in his claimed area. Free and
open access to the property would be allowed for scientific
purposes; however, permission from the claim holder would have
to be obtained to avoid damage to equipment, such as datagathering buoys, etc., that the claimant may have .placed in the
area. After a ten-year period has lapsed, or when a claim is
forfeited, all exploration data that has been gathered on a specific
claim must be placed on file with the registry agency, which files
would be open to the public. Operating statistics, such as recovery
efficiency, production rates, and nodule size, would also be placed
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in these files within one year after an operator has ceased mining
operations in any specific property.
If any group chooses to operate without a lease or permit, it
should be .allowed to do so, but nevertheless that operator must
observe the conservation and multiple use regulations governing
the exploitation of the resources of the sea. Admiralty laws
concerning piracy should prevent anyone from interfering with its
operation. If a company is operating in an area, then it may
register this information with the agency and no one else may
register a claim within 20 miles of its point of operation dating
from the day that this information is registered and extending to
the cessation of its operations. The area of operations must be
defined as the intersection of a line of latitude and longitude.
There would be a nominal $1,000 fee for registering such
information.
A representative of the registry agency would be allowed on
any mining vessel at all times to ascertain that the operator is
observing multiple use and conservation regulations. Enforcement
of these regulations would be through the national government
under which flag the operator is operating.
General exploration and sampling of deposits in the ocean
would be allowed to anyone at no cost in terms of fees paid to
the registry agency and no notification need be given to any
agency of such exploration. Sampling of the deposits by any
individual group would be limited to one million tons of the
nodules in aggregate throughout the ocean, which tonnage should
be sufficient for pilot plant tests or other testing or experimental
purposes, including mining system design studies.
A deep ocean mining legal regime incorporating these
regulations would do much to encourage an orderly development
of one of the great untapped natural resources of the earth. The
tapping of this resource is important for many reasons: in
addition to supplying a growing world population with adequate
supplies of vital raw materials, it would allow the mining
companies to stop despoilation of certain areas of the earth which
could be used for other purposes. Since no ground is being
disturbed or destroyed and only a thin superficial layer of material
will be removed from the ocean floor, no pollution of any kind is
anticipated in sea floor nodule mining operations. No animal or
plant life will be destroyed since few animals and no plants live
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on the deep ocean floor. No human populations will be affected
in any way because no one will live within hundreds of miles of
any deep ocean mining operation. The processing of the nodules
to salable products will not create environmental changes, as the
indicated processing techniques would not involve the releasing to
the atmosphere of any noxious gasses or materials. In fact, it has
been found that the sea floor nodules are excellent oxidationreduction catalysts and might be used in converting unburned
hydrocarbons in internal combustion engines to harmless carbon
dioxide.25 Such exhausts are now recognized as a major pollutant
of the atmosphere. Also the nodules have been found to be
excellent scavengers of sulphur dioxide from stack or other
gasses.26 Sulphur dioxide is a major pollutant in cities and in areas
near power plants which must burn high sulphur coals or oils.
The sea floor nodules would appear to be one of the most
useful objects yet found in nature to aid man to live a decent
material life on this planet without destroying or changing the
natural environment, and in fact might also help to better that
environment.
25. Weisz, Deep Sea Manganese Nodules as Oxidation Catalysts, 10 J.
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26. S. Zimmerley, Use of Deep-Sea Nodules for Removing Sulfur Compounds from
Gases, U.S. Patent 3,330,096, at 1 (1967).

